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Abstract
Ontologies are some of the most central constructs in today’s large plethora
of knowledge technologies, namely in the context of the semantic web. As their
coinage indicates, they are direct heirs to the ontological investigations in the
long Western philosophical tradition, but it is not easy to make bridges between
them. Contemporary ontological commitments often take causality as a central
aspect for the ur-segregation of entities, especially in scientific upper ontologies;
theories of causality and philosophical ontological investigations often go hand-
in-hand, and were essentially inseparable in medieval thought. This constitutes
the foundation for a bridge, and this article analyzes the causality-based ontol-
ogy of the late medieval philosopher Dietrich of Freiberg from the viewpoint of
today’s upper-ontology engineering. In this bridging attempt, it offers a trans-
lation into English of the first part of Dietrich’s De origine (abbreviated title)
that is a compromise between traditional scholarly translations of medieval Latin
philosophical texts and contemporary ontology.
Key words: Mainstream ontology; Formal ontology; Upper ontology; On-
tological commitment; Medieval idealism; Dietrich of Freiberg; Causality-based
ontology
1 Introduction
It appears that today “ontology” is not ontology. Since the 1990s, when this word
emerged in the field of computing, the need has been felt to distinguish ontology as a
branch of philosophy, now called philosophical ontology, from computational ontology.
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While there are some important aspects that indeed make them distinct subjects
to some extent, the fact that they largely share the same vocabulary and the same
methods at the level of upper ontology, or the segregation of the most basic and general
concepts, calls for bridges to be built between them.
Anyone who had to peruse the Aristotelian Categories (Aristotle, sd/1963), the
Kantian Critique of Pure Reason (Kant, 1781/2007), or Husserl’s Logical Investi-
gations (Husserl, 1913/2000) knows that philosophical ontology is not for the faint
of heart. This holds especially for the medieval texts: Medieval philosophers like
Boethius or, much later, Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus are well known today for
their ontological investigations, but the intricacies of their texts do not contribute to
a wider fame, which explains the rare invocations of these authors not only in the field
of computing, but also in contemporary philosophy. However, my view is that this
undesirable state of affairs is greatly due to the lack of work in philosophical ontology
explicitly aiming at an audience in computational ontology, and the unpreparedness
of this to go deep into what can be very specialized literature. I here propose to
begin to change this state of affairs by showing how a particular medieval text can
be (made) relevant to contemporary ontology, namely to the effort of constructing,
or–perhaps more adequately put–engineering, upper ontologies.
This author is now known as Dietrich of Freiberg, a disciple of Albertus Magnus,
and a worthy opponent of Thomas Aquinas. The text I set out from is his ontologi-
cal magnum opus, boldly entitled Treatise on the origin of the categories (Tractatus
de origine rerum praedicamentalium, in Latin; abbreviated De origine), whose first
part I here provide in a translation into English. The medieval philosophy scholar
who reads my translation will certainly notice–and perhaps frown at–what might be
seen as idiosyncratic translations, but the goal was to produce a translation that is
a compromise between medieval ontology literacy and contemporary ontological in-
vestigations.1 In any case, the reader literate in Latin can check the original text
(Dietrich von Freiberg, sd/1983), but I am satisfied that Kurt Flasch and Burkhard
Mojsisch, two well-known medieval philosophy scholars with an acknowledged exper-
tise in this author and in particular in this treatise of his (e.g., Flasch, 2007; Mojsisch,
1977), thoroughly reviewed my first translation a few years ago and approved it for
publication (see Augusto, 2011).
In this article, besides the mentioned translation, I elaborate briefly on the main
current distinctions between the so-called philosophical and computational/scientific
ontologies, I suggest a more appropriate–at least ad-hoc–distinction, and I analyze
the main aspects of upper ontologies in both fields, showing both commonalities and
real differences. This is Part 2 of this article. In Part 3, in which the translation is
given, I also analyze the context of the De origine, and then extract the top level of
an upper ontology from this text. Finally, in Part 4 I offer some comments on the
1For instance, the medieval Latin res in philosophical texts is typically translated as (a) reality;
I here translate it directly as thing. This accounts also for my translating res praedicamentalis as
simply category, rather than categorial reality, as would be expected in a more orthodox translation
(e.g., Colli, 2010, renders res praedicamentalis as realtà predicamentale in Italian); in effect, category
simply abbreviates the rendering of res praedicamentalis as categorial thing, which, in my view, is the
right translation if we consider the distinction between things of first and of second intention, central
in late medieval philosophy and foundational in Dietrich’s text. That I now translate it simply as
category rather than as categorial thing, as I did in my translation into Portuguese a few years ago
(Augusto, 2011), is a result of the abovementioned aim of a compromise.
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work done and on work to be done.
2 Ontologies and Ontological Commitments
2.1 Current Distinctions in Ontology
Ontology, broadly conceived, is the investigation of what entities (there) are.2 In the
Western philosophical tradition, it can be said to have started with Parmenides’ Poem
(ca. 5th century BC). Aristotle, Kant, Meinong, Husserl, they all took ontology to
some form of acme in this tradition. But they are not specifically known as ontologists;
on the contrary, many (theoretical) computer scientists, software engineers, and scores
of staff in large companies today call themselves ontologists, and more often than not
are not familiar with the ontological work of the former. On the other hand, scholars
working in ontology in the field of philosophy are often not familiar with the work of
these ontologists, or even reject that this is related to their ontology. Some scholarly
attempts have been made to bring these two sides together (e.g., Hagengruber & Riss,
2014; Poli & Seibt, 2010; Poli et al., 2010), but the waters have failed to mix.
This might suggest that the two fields are indeed distinct, and terminological
strategies have been proposed to distinguish the two sides. For instance, writing
“Ontology” (vs. ontology) with an uppercase initial to refer to ontology as done in the
field of philosophy, or speaking of ontologies (vs. ontology) to mean the work being
carried out in computing. When “computational ontology” (also: formal ontology) is
used to refer to the latter, then the other side is called philosophical ontology (e.g.,
Hoekstra, 2009; Smith, 2003, 2014).
But the distinctions do not end here. Because most work in ontology today is actu-
ally done with applications in scientific fields in view, there is now the additional need
to make sure that it is understood that this is scientific ontology (e.g., Smith, 2008).3
One way to distinguish this from philosophical ontology is to call the latter specula-
tive ontology, where the adjective “speculative” has a pejorative reading (Humphreys,
2013). As a matter of fact, in any field of application–and ontology engineering is now
(becoming) ubiquitous–it appears that there is the need to distinguish its ontology
making from the philosophical-based ontological investigations.4 Below, I show why
these distinctions are unwarranted, but before doing that I must introduce the main
link between philosophical ontology and the current trends in ontology.
2Instead of of the term “entity,” we can use “being,” but the former is closer to the Greco-Latin
origins of this field of investigation in Western thought: Ens is originally the present participle of esse,
to be; the ts are accounted for by the singular genitive form entis (literally: of a/the being) when
the present participle becomes a noun, which in turn gave origin to the philosophical term “entitas,”
that which essentially defines or characterizes an entity. (Since I am at it, the noun ontology has
its prefix onto- from the same grammatical phenomenon in Greek: on, ontos.) However, I shall use
both terms, though with an obvious preference for “entity.”
3A few examples, with references to online resources, of scientific ontologies: The Gene Ontology
(GO) [1]; the Oral Health and Disease Ontology (OHD) [2]; the Modern Science Ontology (MODSCI)
[3]); MO, the Microarray Gene Expression Society (MGED) Ontology [4]; OBI, the Ontology for
Biomedical Investigations [5].
4See Merrill (2011) for a comprehensive study of this topic in scientific ontology making.
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2.2 Ontology Levels and a Bridge
In a narrower conception, ontology is all about segregating the (kinds of) entities
that compose reality or, more humbly, some domain. The term “entity” should be
here taken in its broadest sense, as referring not only to things, either physical or
abstract, but also to their parts and properties, and the relations things have with
each other. This segregating activity bearing on entities has a very clear-cut objective
in the field of computing, in which practical scientific and corporate applications are
typically considered (e.g., Hoehndorf et al., 2015; Obrst et al., 2003). These constitute
the so-called domain ontologies, which segregate entities of specific domains (e.g.,
medical conditions; automobiles; fishery), but more and more the need is felt for
these ontologies to be based upon–even better: rooted in–what can be called upper
ontologies.5 These address the segregation of entities, their parts and properties, and
their relationships from a more basic and abstract perspective, independently of the
domain ontologies that may use them. For instance, the distinctions of substance and
attribute, part and whole, universal and particular, are typically addressed at this
foundational level.6 All these upper-ontology components can be called ur-elements
and we can speak of ur-segregation at this level.7 These elements are well-known also
by philosophers working in ontology, and thus it appears that the bridge between
both sides is upper-ontology engineering.
A major commonality between upper ontology in computer science and in phi-
losophy is the distinction between universals and particulars. This was actually a
major problematic in medieval ontology (see Pinzani, 2018; Spade, 1994), though the
problematic was not so much on the distinction itself, which was largely accepted
(with some notorious exceptions; e.g., Boethius), but on the ontological status of
the universals: Were these real entities, mere names, or even solely concepts in our
minds? Depending on one’s view, one was a realist, a nominalist, or a conceptualist,
respectively. Today, the distinction is often reduced to a question of instantiation:
Universals are entities that can have instantiations; particulars cannot. For instance,
“Socrates” and “Hypatia” are instantiations of the universal “Human,” but of course
neither of them can be further instantiated. However, in the so-called computa-
tional/scientific ontology, too, the question of instantiation is not without problems:
For instance, are sets universals or particulars? And are “three-angled polygon” and
“three-sided polygon” the same or different particulars? If they are different, are the
sets A = {x|x is a three-sided polygon} and B = {x|x is a three-angled polygon} two
different sets? But if we denote an arbitrary three-angled/-sided polygon by 4, then
extensionally we have {41,42, ...}, which is a single set. And the problem is even
more acute with respect to predicates: While a predicate like IsAnimal (x) allows
5This need has been so pressing that several committees have been organized for the creation
of upper ontologies with a scope of application as broad as possible. Especially noteworthy are
the upper-ontology candidates for the IEEE Standard Upper Ontology initiative SUMO (see Niles
& Pease, 2001), UCO (e.g., Lenat et al., 1986), and IFF (Kent, 2004), as well as the WonderWeb
modules DOLCE (Gangemi et al., 2002), OCHRE (see Masolo et al., 2003), and BFO (Arp et al.,
2015; Grenon, 2003; Grenon et al., 2004).
6More fine-grained hierarchies can be conceived; for instance, an intermediary level between the
upper and the domain ontologies is often considered, and below the domain ontologies one can posit
application ontologies.
7The German noun prefix “Ur-” denotes firstness in time and/or (ontological) rank or status. For
example, Urozean is translated as primeval ocean.
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for many possible instantiations, thus appearing to be indisputably a universal, the
limited instantiations of IsPartOfPeriodontium (x) (see below) throws doubt on its
ontological status as a universal. It does not seem possible to solve these issues with-
out philosophical investigation, which can go as far as taking sides in the triple above
(Realism – Nominalism – Conceptualism) or even in other tuples (see, e.g., Smith &
Ceusters, 2010). On the other hand, philosophical investigation alone will not suffice
to design computer-readable implementations of this distinction. So, maybe together
they can (dis)solve this, as well as other issues in contemporary ontology.
2.3 An Ad-hoc Distinction
In effect, when one focuses on upper ontology as a specific branch of ontology the
distinctions above appear unwarranted. To begin with, the aim of upper-ontology
engineering is to come up with concepts that are–among other features–philosophical
(e.g., Obrst, 2010); thus, the distinction computational vs. philosophical ontology
does not really make sense. Additionally, although different methods might be em-
ployed by the two sides (see Smith, 2003), both in fact aim at segregating concepts
into smaller and smaller disjoint classes of entities, i.e. classes with increasingly fewer
members. For instance, in the top level of SUMO (Suggested Upper Merged Ontology)























Figure 1: Top level of SUMO. (Niles & Pease, 2001.)
Compare this with Porphyry’s tree (Fig. 2), an ontological construct that ac-
companied the development of Western ontology since the Neoplatonist Porphyry,
adapting the Aristotelian theory of the categories, first suggested it in the 3rd cen-
tury AD (cf. his Isagoge: Porphyry, sd/2003; Spade, 1994) and until the late middle
ages.8
The method applied by both is that of partition building and partition refine-
ment.9 In both cases, the classes are partitioned by means of relations such as “is
8See Studtmann (2021) for the roots of Porphyry’s tree in Aristotle’s segregation of the category
substance.
9“Partition” and “refinement” are here to be taken in the mathematical sense: Let A be a set
and Ai 6= ∅ ⊆ A, 1 ≤ i ≤ k; then, the collection P (A) = {A1, A2, ..., Ak} is a partition of A
if (i)
⋃k
i=1 Ai = A and (ii) Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ for all i, j = 1, 2, ..., k, i 6= j. P′ (A) is said to be a
refinement of P (A) if (i)
⋃




i ∈ P′ (A), (ii) |P′ (A)| > |P (A)|, and (iii) for
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Figure 2: Porphyry’s tree.
a,”“is constituted by,”“participates in,” etc., or their negations (e.g., “is not a”), so
that we can reduce ontological concepts to only two: classes and relations. In both
cases, this partitioning is expressed in a logical language.10 These similarities between
both ontological constructs do not sanction a distinction between philosophical and
computational or scientific ontology, either.
But a distinction is needed for several reasons, the most significant of which has to
do with computing machines. Without elaborating on this, I propose that we mimic
a useful distinction in epistemology (see Hendricks, 2006) and talk of mainstream
ontology (MO) and formal ontology (FO) to refer to work in the philosophical and in
the computing/scientific fields, respectively. Just as in the case of epistemology, there
is a real distinction that needs to be taken into consideration: In the same way that
formal epistemology has as a major concern the application of knowledge in machines
(Augusto, 2020), FO requires an ontology to be machine-interpretable, or at least
machine-readable; this is the reason why both subjects require their constructs to be
expressible in a formal language, preferably a logical one, that not only can represent
knowledge as machine-readable constructs, but also allows for automated deduction
over those constructs. Neither MO nor mainstream epistemology have such concerns.
2.4 Shared Conceptualizations
Ontology construction is first and foremost a dynamic process that implicates humans
in general. In effect, every individual is believed to form and constantly change a
semantic memory that, albeit personal, is to a great extent a conceptual construct
constrained by the (largely linguistic) culture to which they belong, which, in turn, is
geographically and temporally localized. I find it useful to refer to these constraints as
the Volks- and Zeitgeist. What they constrain is the formation and change of shared
concepts, or units of meaning that identify things in the world and, at least in most
cultures, can be denoted by signs (e.g., Augusto & Badie, forthcoming). See Figure 3
for this semiotic triangle. (Note in this triangle that reference, the relation between
signs and things in the world, is not affected by the constraints–or pressure–imposed
every A
′
i ∈P′ (A) there is an Aj ∈P (A) such that A
′
i ⊆ Aj .
10In the case of Porphyry’s tree, we have a segregation of genera (in bold; super-classes) into
species (sub-classes) by means of differentiae (expressible by the relation “is not a”). These, together
with the proprium and the accidens, are the universals for medieval thought. To be sure, this is but
a fragmentary and localized example of what is in fact a very large and diverse body of knowledge
that spans several centuries. See Gabbay & Woods (2008) for an overview of medieval logic.
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by the Zeit- and Volksgeist ; as we know since Saussure’s Cours was first published in
1916, this relation is purely conventional.)
Figure 3: The semiotic triangle.
For instance, by verbal communication and reading of non-scientific texts (mag-
azine articles, pamphlets, etc.), most humans acquire a shared concept of disease
that helps them to realize that they might need medical attention of some spe-
cific sort, say, by a dentist. One such shared concept is that of pyorrhea, which
people believe might affect them when their teeth loosen in adulthood. By using
the language of standard first-order predicate logic, we can formalize this belief as
Affects (pyorrhea, tooth), an instantiation of Affects (x, y), where x denotes the
medical condition and y does so for the body part that is affected by/in the condi-
tion. Some fine-graining is possible, with some people actually believing that pyorrhea
affects the tooth root, and not the crown directly. This shows that people usually
share the conceptualization that a tooth has a root and a crown as parts; formally,
we could write HasPart (tooth, crown) and HasPart (tooth, root).
When this natural, spontaneous process of shared conceptualization without which
human communication is not possible (or is at least greatly disturbed; see Badie &
Augusto, forthcoming) is replaced by a strategic process meant to restrict concepts
as they are shared by a specific group of humans (e.g., experts) to a specific context,
then we talk of a consensual (knowledge) construct (see Fig. 4); if this is expressed in
a formal language meant to allow for machine-readability, then we have the orthodox
conception of a FO (e.g., Borst, 1997; Guarino et al., 2009).
Retaking the example above, in technical vocabulary “pyorrhea” is replaced by
“periodontitis,” a coinage that is accounted for by the fact that this dental condition,
which is in fact a bacterial condition, affects the tissues surrounding and supporting
the teeth–the periodontium–and not the teeth themselves; patients with this condition
may in fact lose healthy teeth. In order for a group of experts in the context of
dental medicine to formulate the belief Affects (bacterialP laque, periodontium) ≡
IsDentalCondition (periodontitis), they have to share the same conceptualizations
of all the classes and relations in this equivalence. This requires both a taxonomy of
medical conditions which includes dental conditions and an anatomical taxonomy as
fine-grained as to include the several components of the periodontium, to wit, gingiva,
cementum, alveolar bone, and periodontal ligaments, and this specifically for all the
32 teeth of an adult human.
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Figure 4: The semiotic triangle in FO.
For instance, OHD [2] has a shared conceptualization of a tooth that is far more
complex than that of a lay person:
is-a: Organ with organ cavity
subclasses: Molar tooth, Premolar tooth, Canine tooth, Incisor
tooth, Primary tooth, Secondary tooth
regional part: Crown of tooth, Root of tooth
attributed part: Crown of tooth, Root of tooth, Apex of tooth,
Cavity of tooth, Enamel, Cement, Dentine, Dental pulp, Periodon-
tium
physical state: Solid
As seen above, sufferers of periodontitis more often than not do not know that there
is some oral “entity” called the periodontium, which is the locus of their condition.
OHD contrasts with this by proposing the following profuse conceptualization for the
periodontium, which considers an exhaustive discrimination of the periodontia into
constituents, the ligaments in the following example, and this for all the teeth of an
adult human:
is-a: Set of ligaments
member of: Mandibular dental arcade, Set of periodontia
member: Periodontium of right lower second premolar tooth, Pe-
riodontium of left lower first premolar tooth, Periodontium of
left lower second premolar tooth, Periodontium of right lower first
premolar tooth, Periodontium of right lower first molar tooth,
Periodontium of left lower canine tooth, Periodontium of left lower
first molar tooth, Periodontium of right lower canine tooth, Pe-
riodontium of right lower second molar tooth, Periodontium of left
lower lateral incisor tooth, Periodontium of left lower second
molar tooth, Periodontium of right lower lateral incisor tooth,
Periodontium of right lower third molar tooth, Periodontium of
left lower central incisor tooth, Periodontium of right lower cen-
tral incisor tooth, Periodontium of left lower third molar tooth
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This is then further fine-grained for skeletal ligaments:
is-a: Skeletal ligament
subclasses: Periodontium of lower central incisor tooth, Peri-
odontium of upper lateral incisor tooth, Periodontium of lower
lateral incisor tooth, Periodontium of upper first premolar tooth,
Periodontium of upper second premolar tooth, Periodontium of up-
per third molar tooth, Periodontium of lower first molar tooth,
Periodontium of lower first premolar tooth, Periodontium of lower
third molar tooth, Periodontium of upper central incisor tooth,
Periodontium of upper canine tooth, Periodontium of lower sec-
ond premolar tooth, Periodontium of lower canine tooth, Periodon-
tium of lower second molar tooth, Periodontium of upper first mo-
lar tooth, Periodontium of upper second molar tooth
constitutional part: Epithelial cell of Malassez
regional part: Collagen fiber of periodontium
Finally, the periodontium of every tooth is subject to further specification. I leave
here a single example:
is-a: Periodontium of lower central incisor tooth
constitutional part of: Right lower central secondary incisor
tooth
member of: Set of mandibular periodontia
This shared conceptualization, now at the FO level, constitutes the basis of an ontol-
ogy for oral health and dental conditions aiming at allowing for a uniform analysis
of dental health records and also at facilitating translation of texts in oral medicine.
But OHD is a domain ontology; the types of classes it considers for the above instan-
tiations and the relations for those classes (“Is a,” “Is a subclass of,” “Is a regional
part of,” etc.) are shared conceptualizations at the level of an upper ontology.11 At
this level, a shared conceptualization is the result of an ontological commitment.
2.5 Upper Ontologies and Ontological Commitments
It is often useful to define ontological commitment formally (e.g., Guarino, 1998),
but it suffices here to see this as the (consequences of the) ontological choices that
are made with respect to the basic, or most general, categories and their relations.
For instance, the axioms for primitive relations and functions in DOLCE (Descriptive
Ontology for Linguistic and Cognitive Engineering) consider parthood (“x is part
of y”), temporary parthood (“x is part of y during t”), constitution (“x constitutes
y during t”), participation (“x participates in y during t”), quality (“x is a quality
of y”), and quale (“x is the quale of y [during t ]”). From these axioms, it can be
seen that DOLCE considers time to be foundational in the sense that the parthood
and quale relations may be temporary, i.e. as taking place during time t, and both
the constitution and participation relation are temporal relations. This entails that
11BFO (an “exploratory version,” according to the authors of OHD), in this case.
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DOLCE’s entities are perdurants, or 4D entities, i.e. entities that happen or extend
in time (“space-time worms,” in the literature). In this viewpoint, both a book and
the reading a book are perdurants. Hence, we can say that DOLCE is 4D-oriented, or
perdurantist. If, on the contrary, entities are conceived as being wholly present at any
moment of their existence, then we speak of endurants, or 3D entities. SUMO (see
Fig. 1) is a 3D-oriented, or endurantist upper ontology, as its ur-partition of physical
objects into objects and processes indicates.
The spatial-temporal aspect can be considered foundational of an upper ontology
with respect not only to its relations, but also to its entities. BFO (Basic Formal
Ontology) distinguishes between the SNAP entities, which are 3D entities (specifically:
biological objects), and the SPAN entities, which are 4D entities (biological processes),
but does so with the aim of a compatibility between 3D and 4D entities (Grenon et
al., 2004). (See Fig. 5.) As for relations, and just to compare with the above
relations in DOLCE, BFO considers both trans-ontological relations between SPAN
and SNAP entities (e.g., dependence, participation, termination, etc.) and intra-











































Figure 5: BFO: The principal categories.
Other consequences of one’s ontological choices are reflected on the basic cate-
gories in different ways. For instance, DOLCE and BFO are said to be multiplicative
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and descriptive upper ontologies, it being meant by this, respectively, that there is a
profusion of categories in the sense that these can include anything that seems to be
required and the categories are conceived by taking into consideration the cognitive
abilities of humans. These choices are made evident with respect to BFO when Grenon
et al. (2004) characterize the methodology used to design BFO as realist (reality and
its constituents exist independently of our theoretical conceptualization thereof), fal-
libilist (our theories and classifications may be subject to revision), perspectivalist
(there is a plurality of perspectives on reality, all legitimate), and adequatist (there is
no single basic view to which all these perspectives can be reduced to). The opposite
choices produce reductionist and revisionist upper ontologies, respectively: The for-
mer reduces the number of concepts to the fewest primitives believed to be sufficient
for the derivation of the categorial or conceptual complexity that characterizes real-
ity, and the latter bases its ur-partition on philosophical and scientific theories, rather
than on human cognitive abilities. OCHRE, for instance, is said to be reductionist
and revisionist. Interestingly, SUMO is categorized as being both multiplicative and
reductionist.
2.6 Causality in Upper Ontologies
Causality is ubiquitous not only in science, but also in everyday reasoning.12 Given
the ubiquity of causal reasoning, it would be expected that upper ontologies would
consider causality. In effect, causal relations or functions such as principle (“x is a
principle of y”), origin (“x originates y”), or, more plainly, cause (“x is a cause of
y”) often feature in scientific upper ontologies (e.g., Kaneiwa et al., 2007; Rovetto &
Mizoguchi, 2015). However, it is often considered at lower-level partitioning, below
the top-level ur-segregations (e.g., Partridge et al., 2020). This ur-element segregation
can be captured by what van Inwagen & Sullivan (2014) call the “old” metaphysics,
constituted by being as such, first causes, unchanging things, categories of being and
universals, and substance.
Do we need these ur-elements, in particular the “first causes,” in upper ontolo-
gies? Consider, for instance, a mathematical(-oriented) (upper) ontology (e.g., Gru-
ber & Olsen, 1994; [6]). The ontological status of mathematical objects, including
statements or propositions, is far from consensual, so that an upper ontology for a
mathematical ontology will probably require a notion of mathematical being or en-
tity, for which the ur-elemental being as such is required. This ur-element will, in
turn, be associated to first causes: Seen as real entities, then one has the hard task
of accounting for the apparently purely ideal (or abstract) existence of mathematical
entities, a stance known as platonism in the philosophy of mathematics.13 According
to this view, mathematical objects lack causal powers, but they themselves are be-
lieved to have a natural cause, independent of their being known. If seen as mental
constructions, however, then their cause must be the human mind, namely the mental
practices involving them (e.g., Font et al., 2013), so that perhaps the human mind,
too, might be required as a causal ur-element in an upper ontology that is conceived
for a mathematical ontology.
12See the example above of pyorrhea / periodontitis.
13Also Platonism, with an uppercase initial p. See, e.g., Brown (2008) for both Platonism and
constructivist approaches in the philosophy of mathematics.
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3 Extracting an Upper Ontology from Dietrich of
Freiberg’s De origine
3.1 Medieval Ontology as Upper-Ontology Making
Medieval ontology was essentially concerned with the main topics of what can be called
the “old” metaphysics (van Inwagen & Sullivan, 2014; see above), with a special focus
on the universals and the categories, both rooting in Aristotelian metaphysics. Al-
though there was no explicit notion of an ontological commitment (even because there
was no notion that one was “making” ontology), it is today possible to analyze me-
dieval ontological constructions from this perspective. For instance, Porphyry’s tree
(Fig. 2) can be said to be a reductionist and revisionist upper ontology: The frugality
of categories it considers is obvious, and their selection is based on a philosophical
theory, namely Aristotle’s theory of the categories. I think it is safe to say that it
is an endurantist upper ontology, as time appears to play no role whatsoever in it.
This is a feature that can be generalized perhaps to most medieval ontologies, the
Christian belief in creation and its immutability being possibly to account for this,
even if time was not absent from philosophical discussions, namely in its association
with change (see, e.g., Porro, 2001; see also Rudavsky, 2000). Equally, most medieval
ontologies can be said to be reductionist and revisionist; despite the frequent ten-
dency to be “generous” to a fault with their partition refinements, this was basically
not done (explicitly) from the viewpoint of human cognition and medieval ontologists
were convinced that their distinctions had an authoritative basis.
In particular, up to the 12th century the theoretical stance underlying ontological
investigations was realism, the ur-elements of reality being considered as having a
real existence, as being products of natural operations.14 Thus, ontology “making”
was concerned with isolating all the real entities. These were not only the natural
things, but also the forms in the verbum, so that one can speak of realism of forms,
or Platonism. This changes in the 13th century with the emergence of a strong form
of intellectualism (Augusto, 2009).
3.2 The Context and Goals of the De origine
One of the major debates in medieval philosophical thought that spanned basically
all the subjects, from logic and grammar to metaphysics and physics, concerned the
universals (see Porphyry’s tree above): Are they real, i.e. natural kinds (Latin: res),
or are they solely mental entities such as, say, names (nomina) or concepts? This
question caused emotions to fly high, and on its reply depended the status of any
ontological construct; this, in turn, impacted on their epistemic status. Fact is that
with the discovery of both all the major texts of Aristotle and the works of the
Arab Helenizing philosophers, or falasifa, in the 12th century the association between
ontology and epistemology became uncomfortable, as it created a tension between
the Christian view of reality and its philosophical–i.e. Aristotelian and Arabic via
Neoplatonism–explanation. What of divine creation in light of the Aristotelian causes?
What exactly were the intellectual powers of humans according to the hierarchy of
14Divine operations were related to the created world, so this fostered realism in metaphysics.
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intellects transmitted by Arabic philosophy? What is the complete ur-segregation of
entities?
The introduction in medieval Latin philosophy of the Arab theory of intentions








Briefly, reality comprised both natural entities and mental entities, or intentions.
The entities of first intention were the concepts of natural entities, their signs, or
what metaphysics calls today natural kinds, or even just their mental names, and the
entities of second intention were essentially the universals (genus, species, etc.), seen
thus as signs of signs.15 It should be remarked that there is actually an ontological
superiority of the first intentions with respect to the second ones, which were seen as
mere entia rationis, beings of reason, with an inferior ontological status. Intention
(intentio, in Latin) was conceived as something in the human soul or psyche that by
nature signified something else (it so to say tended to the outer world, tending being
the original meaning of the related Greek verb enteinein), but it could also be taken
as understanding, or knowing.16 So, we are here in the realms of both epistemology
and ontology; in other words, the very first distinction of entities is one that concerns
the cognition of reality. More specifically, Dietrich attributes to the things of first
intention the ontological ur-phenomenon by means of which an entity firstly differs
from nothingness in a formal way.
This, of course, is epistemological idealism (Augusto, 2005, 2006a), or, if one wants
the benefit of reservations, intellectualism, a trend initiated in late medieval philos-
ophy by Albertus Magnus and prolonged by the other Dominican scholastics (see
Augusto, 2009). At the basis of this late medieval stance is an incipient representa-
tionalist theory of mind that has its roots in Aristotle (Augusto, 2006b). Figure 6
shows concisely the semiotic triangle for the conception of Dietrich’s De origine.
So, what Dietrich of Freiberg had in mind when writing on the origin of the
categories promised to be of impact. In his Introduction to this text, Dietrich began
by stating the objective:
(Intr.,1) As the Philosopher says in his Sophistical Refutations,17 when
the common things are not known, it is inevitable that there lack the
knowledge of the particular ones. Most common of all are the entity (ens)
and those things that belong to an entity essentially. I speak of those
things that belong to an entity essentially either as parts of an entity, or
as passions and proper accidents essentially belonging to an entity as an
entity.
15In Latin: res primae intentionis and res secundae intentionis. See Gyekye (1971) for the very
complex adoption of this distinction in later medieval philosophy.
16I use here the terms soul, mind, and psyche interchangeably; the later medieval intellectualist
reading of Aristotle’s De anima, I argue (e.g., Augusto, 2006b), sanctions this interchangeability.
17Aristotle, Soph. el. I, 1, 164a21-2. I give here the references exactly as they are given by L.
Sturlese in Dietrich of Freiberg (sd/1983). I refer the reader to this work for the complete references.
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Figure 6: Semiotic triangle for the conception of De origine.
Interestingly, in only a few introductory sentences, Dietrich manages to use the main
concepts of what today we call an upper ontology, either implicitly or explicitly:
With respect to the former, Dietrich mentions the universals (“common things,” in
the passage) to then mention the particulars explicitly; still in this manner he uses the
terms “part,”“passion,” and “accident.” Also indirect is the reference to the essence
of an entity. The aim is epistemological, i.e. all these ontological items are meant to
allow for knowledge of both the universals and the particular things.
Dietrich goes on to state that the first parts of an entity are the categories, and
thus he proposes to investigate them with respect to their origin and nature. For
convenience, I here leave the translated paragraph:
(Intr., 2) But the genera of the categories (res praedicamentales) are the
very first parts of an entity. Therefore, we must somehow examine them
in general, that is, the origin and nature of the categories.
It must be remarked that the categories in the semiotic triangle of the De origine
(see Fig. 6) were the ten original Aristotelian categories (substance, quantity, quality,
relation, place, time, position, state, action, and passion), but they were typically
considered from the viewpoint of the Porphyrian universals mentioned above (genus,
species, differentia, proprium, and accidens). After briefly explaining what had led
him to elaborate on a subject of such “exceedingly obscure difficulty”–some friends
had asked him to write something on it, and since so many had written so much about
it, he saw no reason why he should not oblige them–Dietrich states the topic of the
first part of the De origine:
(Intr., 5) In the first part, the origin of the categories in general and,
together with this, the nature and origin of the substance in particular are
dealt with.
So, the first part of the De origine elaborates on the origin of the categories with a
focus on the substance, the very Aristotelian “ur-category.” Before I give the transla-
tion of this text, I provide a brief elaboration on causality, as in fact Dietrich is going
to write on the origin of the categories and of the substances from a causal viewpoint.
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3.3 Causality, Medieval Ontology, and Dietrich’s “Bombs”
Augustine wrote in various passages–profusely so in his Confessions (Augustine,
sd/1992)–that human knowing was an act of illumination in which humans were “il-
luminated” by divine grace with the forms in the verbum. Quite differently from
Augustine, possibly the biggest philosophical auctoritas until the 12th century and
who was very much influenced by the Platonic theory of ideas, Aristotle thought that
in order to know the objects of reality one needed to know their causes. When the full
extent of his thought reaches the later middle ages, the Augustinian verbum does not
exactly lose its explanatory power with respect to how humans know the constituents
of reality, as its elements are the universals, which according to Aristotle were to be
found in the human soul (see Augusto, 2006b). But humans live in a world of par-
ticular things–i.e. instantiations of the universals–and the theory of illumination lost
much of its spark to explain how we know these when the four Aristotelian causes
provided what appeared to be a better epistemological account.
White (2018) starts an encyclopedia article on medieval philosophy and theories
of causality with these words:18
Causality plays an important role in medieval philosophical writing: the
dominant genre of medieval academic writing was the commentary on
an authoritative work, very often a work of Aristotle. Of the works of
Aristotle thus commented on, the Physics plays a central role. Other of
Aristotle’s scientific works–On the Heavens and the Earth, On Generation
and Corruption, and, of course, the Metaphysics–are also significant for
the study of causation: so there is a rather daunting body of work to
survey.
And, in effect, all these texts are (explicitly or implicitly) mentioned in the first part
of the De origine. But not only these Aristotelian texts are mentioned or invoked:
Commentaries thereon by Averroes, the most influential Arab commentator of Aris-
totle in the late middle ages, as well as texts from Avicenna, another influential Arab
philosopher, and the Neoplatonist Proclus, to mention the most important auctori-
tates, feature abundantly in this treatise. In the translated text, the reader will have
the opportunity to read what Dietrich of Freiberg thought their stances and theories
were, and it suffices here to review briefly Aristotle’s four causes. According to Aris-
totle, every natural entity has a material cause (its matter, that which it is made of),
a formal cause (its form, or the arrangement of its parts), an efficient cause (that or
who makes it be what it is by means of acting upon it), and a final cause (what it is
for).
Dietrich agreed with all these causes, but he wanted to add another one. To begin





In other words, whatever exists is caused either by a natural act or a mental act.
This is actually an ur-partition, which means that the disjunction is exclusive. In
18I refer the reader to White (2018) for the complete references of the cited works by Aristotle.
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a progressive analysis of the kinds of entities that exist in relation to their causes,
Dietrich of Freiberg concludes that seven of the Aristotelian categories have their
causal origin in the mind or psyche (his first ontological “bomb”), but not as things of
second intention; they are actually things of first intention, it being the case that it is
in virtue of these that a thing, an entity, firstly differs from nothingness in a formal
way (the second “bomb”). In other words, that a thing is, or can be, known.
3.4 Treatise on the Origin of the Categories: Translation of
Part 1
On the origin of the categories in general and, together with this,
on the cause and origin of the substance in particular
(1) The manner of originating or beginning an entity according to which
that entity essentially depends on its very own principle is threefold.19 By
entity, I here mean that which is in itself, and which is complete in terms
of the act that belongs to it according to its own genus; I also mean that
which has the nature and the character of an entity in its essence, and
not according to the sole designation.20 I here mean to say the direct
dependency that is considered in terms of some causal origin, not as it is
in the entities that depend on others as on a necessary cause, or as any
other possible manner of indirect dependency.21
(2) Such an entity, I say, in one way is originated or begins from some-
thing else in terms of cause; which indeed makes it so that such a causal
principle is outside the essence of a thing, but it nevertheless assembles
and constitutes that thing in its being in the manner of either an efficient
principle, or an end.22
(3) In another way, a thing is originated from those principles that are
in its essence and, out of these components that qualify it, it subsists
thanks to that very essence; of this kind are the matter and the form in
the composite things.23
19“Beginning” may appear odd here, but think of “beginning a drawing,”“beginning (to write) a
book,”“beginning an argument,” etc.
20To be sure, a circular definition in the second part (after the semicolon) and the first part
also needs clarification. Roughly, according to Aristotelian metaphysics an entity is either in itself
(or essentially) or in another entity (or accidentally). What exists in itself, or subsists, i.e. has
an independent existence, is a substance (from the Latin substare, to underlie); what exists in a
substance is an accident. This said, accidents, too, as entities have their own essence, that which
makes them be what they are. Also in Aristotelian metaphysics, there are two modes of being in
which any entity can be, to wit, in act or in potency. For instance, and to put it simply, a piece of
marble is a statue–of, say, a horse–in potency, whereas the statue itself is a statue in act. In this
interpretation, to be in act for an entity is to attain the realization, or completeness, of its potency.
Obviously, being in act can only be so from the viewpoint of the genus of an entity: An animal (say,
a horse) can only be in act as a living animal, and not as a statue of an animal.
21Dietrich clarifies what he means by beginning or starting an entity: This must be taken in the
sense of a causal origin, so that the caused entity depends directly on the cause.
22First type of cause: The Aristotelian efficient and final causes, here considered as extrinsic causes
(or causes proper). I call them OUT-causes.
23Second type of cause: These are the Aristotelian material and formal causes, here taken as
intrinsic causes (= principles). I call these IN-causes. Note that Dietrich speaks here of “composite
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(4) And this difference between these two ways is considered by the Com-
mentator in On the Fifth Book of the Metaphysics,24 where he distinguishes
the notions of principle, element, and cause according to the ways above,
to wit: Causes proper are those which originate a thing from outside its
essence; elements are actually those that do it from within a thing; princi-
ples are those that originate a thing both from outside and from within.25
(5) But there is a third way in which something takes the notion of its
entity from something else, still unnamed—make up a name for it as you
wish, as long as it agrees with its character and truth. More often than
not one sees this way considered in terms of some analogy, as it will be
evident below. This way is that in which something is a principle for
another in such a way that by virtue of this very principle existing outside
the essence of that whose principle it is, by virtue of that same principle
does it, whose principle it is, nevertheless subsist formally, inasmuch as it
takes from that same existing principle the notion of its entity or quiddity
from our conception of it.26 Hence, it falls in the definition of that entity
stating what it is as an entity. And in this way are the things of a kind
other than the substance inasmuch as they are entities, as it will be shown
below, where this way will be distinguished.27
(6) The notion of entity is different according to these three ways, in terms
of which it is reduced to some kind of these principles.28
(7) In fact, if an entity is considered in terms of its intrinsic principles, and
this with respect to the second aforementioned way, then a thing formally
has according to itself, absolutely, the notion of entity, which is the first
of all intentions, by means of which a thing firstly differs formally from
things,” or things with parts, which suggests that there are also simple things (i.e. things without
parts). In any case, Dietrich states that the IN-causes are qualifying.
24Averroes, In Aristotelis Met. V, comm. 4, ed. Ponzalli 83.
25“The Commentator” (of Aristotle) was a usual way to refer to Averroes in later medieval phi-
losophy, i.e. medieval philosophy in and after the 13th century, approximately. Note how Dietrich
invokes the authority of Averroes to support his own exposition of a tripartition of causes, even
if–as is the case–Averroes’ tripartition does not completely match his. But auctoritas, concretized
in auctores or auctoritates, was a central concern for medieval philosophers.
26I.e., from our understanding or comprehension (intellectus, in Latin) of it. Still better: from our
knowing or conceiving it.
27The definition of an entity (definitio entis, in Latin) is the same as its essence (essentia entis),
though it tended to be used more frequently in logical writings. This is a central paragraph in
this text: Dietrich introduces the third way of giving origin to, or causing, an entity. This is the
way in which something’s principle (so, an IN-cause) is a cause (so, extrinsic to the entity that
is thus originated, or an OUT-cause) with respect to some other thing, but thanks to which this
other thing subsists formally. Dietrich calls them extrinsic principles, which can be a source of
confusion; I call these the OUTIN-causes. As we shall see below, these are the causal origin of
some–seven–of the Aristotelian accidents. The notion of formal subsistence is related to the form as
the entitas, or quiddity (quiditas) of an entity, a core concept of medieval metaphysics that can be
said to capture what (quid) a thing is, i.e. its complete definition, the collection of all its essential
attributes. Importantly, this formal subsistence is “given” to a thing via the conception we have of
it. Anticipating contents in part 5 of De origine, these OUTIN-causes are the principles of cognition
in the human mind. So, Dietrich is laying out the path to elaborate on his view that the human
mind can also be a causal origin for an entity.
28Three different causes, three different entities; Dietrich announces his ur-partition of entities
according to the ur-partition of causes briefly elaborated on above.
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nothingness.29 For when something is said to be an entity, there is only a
certain formal account thereof in terms of that intrinsic principle of itself
by means of which a thing subsists formally and in terms of the act, which
is the form in the composite things, or the essence in act alone in the
simple things.30
(8) Concerning these simple essences, the Philosopher says in Book VIII
of the Metaphysics31 that there is no matter in them, either sensible or
intelligible, each and every one of them being immediately one and an
entity just like those entities that do not belong to their genus:32 Which
simply means that each and every one of these simple entities in terms of
its essence is one and an entity without the participation of any extrinsic
cause. Which is equally true of the composite things inasmuch as each and
every one of them subsists formally in terms of its intrinsic principles, even
if, because they proceed from the potency to the act, they also contain
an extrinsic cause, as the Philosopher says in the same place.33 Hence
the Commentator in his On Book XI of the Metaphysics,34 where the
Philosopher35 distinguishes between the intrinsic causes, which are the
matter and the form, and the extrinsic causes, which are the end and the
efficient cause, for the reason that the latter precede the thing while the
former are simultaneous with it, says: “The causes by virtue of which a
thing becomes an entity and a unity occur together with that which on
account of them becomes the whole simultaneously, given that they have
such a determination in the aggregate as do the parts in the whole.”36
(9) Thus, an entity is said to be in an absolute sense thanks to its essence in
terms of its intrinsic principles. And because an entity said in these terms
29A central passage: An entity differs formally from nothingness, or non-being, thanks to the first
intention, i.e. its mental conception (see Part 3.2 above). Note that Dietrich does not say that an
entity exists simpliciter thanks to the first intention. So, we have here already two types of existence,
one of them being at a solely formal level.
30The form, of the two IN-causes, has ontological superiority in the sense that it is the principle
thanks to which a composite thing subsists formally; the simple things subsist formally thanks to
their essence in act alone. The point to keep in mind here is that form can thus be equivalent to
essence. But this requires us to think of form not in the sense that a chair has the form of a chair
(the Aristotelian formal cause), but that an entity may exist solely formally. This notion of form is
particularly interesting for mathematical objects, for instance, such as the numbers and geometric
shapes.
31Aristotle, Met. VIII, 6, 1045a36-b1; 1045b5-6.
32Note the fact that there are two types of matter, intelligible or sensible.
33Aristotle, Met. VIII, 6, 1045b20-22.
34Averroes, In Aristotelis Met. XII, comm. 16, Venetiis 1562, 302vH.
35Aristotle, Met. XII, 3, 1070a21-22.
36This paragraph affirms the ontological superiority of the IN-causes: There are substances that are
originated from them alone (the simple essences have as cause only the form) and even the composite
things, in which there is a relation between the whole and the parts, could not subsist without them.
The reason for this superiority is, according to Dietrich, the fact that they are required for a thing
to subsist formally, and this is what first distinguishes a thing from nothingness (see above). On the
other hand, Dietrich is also stating the latter’s ontological status as entities, i.e. it is not because
they have OUT-causes that they have a lower status when compared to the simple essences. The
difference between both is that, as Dietrich writes in the next paragraph, the simple essences have
no accidents, and are thus not subject to change.
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does not contain any cause,37 that is why it is free from all accidents
entailing some nature or thing determining the very essence of a thing,
thanks to which a thing is in some way in relation to change. And the
reason for this is that each and every one of such accidents is some form
and act of an entity that is a substance, even if in an accidental way;
therefore, the relation of a substance to such a form is the relation of
the existing in potency to the act.38 Nothing, however, that is such can
actualize itself; that is why a substance, according to the notion thanks
to which it is an entity in an absolute sense by virtue of its essence, is
not the cause of such accidents except in terms of the matter and of the
subject. Thus, such forms become in a substance by virtue of a cause that
is extrinsic to the essence of that which is the subject of such accidents,
namely by means of a generator, if they are accidents essentially, or, if they
are not, by a mover in some other way. And the Philosopher indicated this
in Of Physics I,39 where he says that the matter together with the form is
the cause of those entities that are in substances, like the mother. Unless
due to a more formal faculty, which is that of the agent, the mother is not
a principle in generation; in the same way accidents are not in a substance
unless thanks to another principle extrinsic to the subject.40
(10) Therefore, whatever things are in an entity in an absolute sense in
terms of the essence, they are so in the absence of any extrinsic cause; and
on account of this, properly speaking, such things do not have a real cause
other than the essence of the thing in which they are, as are the one and
the many and their differences.41
(11) And from this it also follows that such things do not entail any nature
or any natural thing superadded to the essence, nor are they accidents
proper, but properties of a thing due to whose inexistence a thing is not
something better, as it is said in Of Physics II;42 but that which is said to
be a thing on account of them is essentially in terms of its quiddity and
essence.43 But this is not so in the natural things, in which case, from
some accidents superadded to a substance, the notion of the good and of
the proper in nature is considered in terms of the end, in relation to which
37OUT-cause.
38Dietrich relates the accidents to the substance as the relation of the existing in potency to the
act. Interestingly, it appears that without the accidents an entity could not be in act. The entities
meant here are not the simple ones, as these are not subject to change (e.g., the numbers?), but the
composite substances.
39Aristotle, Phys. I, 9, 192a13-14.
40Another hard nut to crack, but the idea is that accidents exist in a composite substance not
thanks to its IN-causes simpliciter (the matter and the form) but thanks to an extrinsic principle,
or OUTIN-cause, where again the apparently contradictory combination “extrinsic principle” in (5)
is meant.
41These–the one and the many and their differences–are not accidents, as they are in an entity in
an absolute sense in terms of its essence, so thanks to IN-causes alone. These are called properties.
See (11).
42Aristotle, Phys. II, 2, 194a3-7.
43That is, the properties belong to the quiddity or essence of an entity. In other words, theirs are
IN-causes alone. Also, the entities meant here are the simple entities, so that in fact simple entities
just are their properties.
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an agent makes such accidents in a subject.44
(12) Therefore it is evident what the notion of entity is according to which
it is considered as subsisting only in terms of its intrinsic principles, that
is, that according to this alone it formally has the character of an entity;
and this manner firstly and essentially befits a substance.45 Hence, to
reflect on this entity and its proprieties in these terms is the proper job of
the metaphysician.46
(13) If, however, a thing is considered in relation to its causes, and this
with respect to the first of the aforementioned ways,47 then it falls off the
said notion of entity. Indeed, according to this something is said to be
an entity inasmuch as emanating from some productive principle with a
view to some end. And according to this it has a natural character and
denomination by virtue of the broad sense of the term ‘natural,’ so that
one means nature not only inasmuch as it is a principle of change and
rest, as in the Physics,48 but also so that nature is said whatever is a
principle of some real operation, subject, or end according to which the
individual entities are said natural things. And according to this each and
every entity is said to be a natural thing in relation to its causes,49 namely
inasmuch as it is from a natural act in relation to some end, which is by
nature, in which it participates by means of its natural operation: indeed,
an agent does not act essentially except with a view to an end; otherwise,
its action would be merely by chance, as it is said in Of Physics II.50
(14) If therefore such a thing is by its essence originally able to be in
relation to an end and to participate in the perfection of its end, the sort
of things that the philosophers believed to be certain entities they called
intelligences,51 in such entities, I say, there must be no accident, because,
as it is said in On the Heaven and the World II,52 each and every entity
is for the sake of its operation. Indeed, the operation is the end within,
by means of which end an entity participates in an absolute way in the
perfection of the end. If there were such entities, as the philosophers
believed, and they according to them are by their essence the principle
44Contrary to the simple entities, the natural things have accidents, and these entail an OUT-cause,
the end (the Aristotelian final cause).
45The substance is separated from the remaining nine Aristotelian categories: Substances have
solely IN-causes, and it is thanks to these alone, namely to the form, that they can be said to
be formally an entity. The importance of the adverb of manner “formally” in this text is crucial:
Without subsisting formally, an entity cannot be known by the human mind (although, anticipating
Kant, it can be thought ; see (14) below).
46So, metaphysicians study pure substances, the natural things being outside the scope of meta-
physics. The natural things–substances with accidents–fall, of course, in the scope of physics. In
other words, the subject of the metaphysician is formal existence.
47OUT-causes.
48Aristotle, Phys. II, 1, 192b20-23.
49OUT-causes.
50Aristotle, Phys. II, 8, 198b34-199a12.
51E.g.: Liber de causis, prop.7 – 13, ed. Pattin, 149-64; Proclus, Elem. theol., prop. 20, ed.
Vansteenkiste, 273; ibid., prop. 166-183, ed. Vansteenkiste, 514-521; Avicenna, Metaph. IX, 5,
Venetiis 1508, 104v – 105r; Averroes, In Aristotelis Metaph. XII, comm. 38, Venetiis 1562, 321rF –
vG; ibid., XII, comm. 51, 336rD, 336vL – M.
52Aristotle, De caelo II, 3, 286a8-9.
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of their operation,53 there would be in them no nature extraneous to
their essence, to which extraneous nature accidents belong: In vain would
entities be that nature does not allow. Hence the Commentator in On
Metaphysics XII says:54 “One must know that substances are in two ways:
A way in which it is impossible to avoid accidents, and another without
any accident; the former is sensible, the latter, however, is intelligible.”
And there he speaks of the separate substances according to his and other
philosophers’ opinion.55
(15) But if there are such entities that are not originally able to attain the
perfection of their end except by means of some altering and altogether
motive change in themselves, in all such entities it is necessary to find
other natures extraneous to their essences, which are the principles of
such changes in an active or in a passive way.56
(16) But the principles of such changes essentially and immediately are
qualities. Hence, it is necessary that local change precede in the natural
things.57
(17) But before anything else continuous quantity is required in all the ac-
tive and passive things, and in the altogether motive according to nature.
In fact, it is only right that the agent and the patient should be simulta-
neous, as it is said in the first Book of On Generation and Corruption;58
it is indeed necessary that they have in their parts both distinction and
extension, which happens thanks to quantity, whence quantity is, accord-
ing to its genus, the first of all accidents in nature. Hence, and for this
reason, in relation to a first moved continuum it first and foremost befits
the first body to be a continuous quantum, as the Philosopher says in the
beginning of Book X of the Metaphysics.
(18) This is nature’s reason and intention in constituting those accidents
that entail a natural thing. It follows that–if there are some entities,
which are called accidents, which are principles neither of a natural nor of
53Cf. Liber de causis, prop. 8, comm., ed. Pattin, 152; ibid., prop. 13, ed. Pattin, 162-164;
Proclus, Elem. theol., prop. 167 – 168, ed. Vansteenkiste, 514-515; Avicenna, Metaph. IX 4,
Venetiis 1508, 104vaA.
54Averroes, In Aristotelis Met. XII, comm. 25, Venetiis 1562, 310rB.
55Averroes, In Aristotelis Met. XII, comm. 25, Venetiis 1562, 310rB-E. These entities called
intelligences (intelligentiae, in Latin) were an object of heated debate in medieval philosophy: Were
these motors of the cosmos the biblical angels? The Dominican scholastics, Dietrich included, tended
to distinguish these. See Piron (2008) for a comprehensive study of this issue. Important in this
paragraph is the fact that Dietrich appears to posit yet another type of cause: The end, taken in
the sense of the Aristotelian final cause, is an OUT-cause, i.e. extrinsic to the essence of the entity;
here, however, he speaks of an intrinsic end with respect to the intelligences, correlating this directly
with their operation. I leave this issue without an answer (see Fig.s 8-9). What we can draw from
this paragraph is that the intelligences do not have accidents, or “attributes,” and Dietrich appears
to accept the Aristotelian ur-segregation between sensible and intelligible substances.
56The adjective “motive” has to do with motion (or movement) and change (motus, in Latin), a
particularly equivocal concept in the sense that it translates the Aristotelian kinêsis (which includes
change of place), but also metabolê (change, as in, for instance, being generated and getting older).
This was a central concept for Aristotle, who saw it as the sine-qua-non notion to understand nature.
57Dietrich appears to say that qualities in a natural thing have OUT-causes, and they are in turn
the IN-causes for changes.
58Aristotle, De gen. et corr. I, 7, 323b31-33.
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a real operation, as are some relative determinations and that very entity
that is the ‘when,’ and certain other entities–such entities are not from a
natural act. For nature does not act unless in relation to an end, which is
some nature, an end that a thing attains by means of its natural or real
operation.59
(19) But as in entities there are only two kinds of principles, to wit, nature
and the intellect, if such entities are not constituted by a natural act, it
is necessary that they be of the other sort and be reduced to the other
kind of cause, which is the intellect.60 However, not in that way as those
entities that are from an operation of the intellect in such a way that
they are things of second intention, which do not belong to any kind of
real entities in a determinate way: These truly are things of first intention
essentially according to their own reasons classed in a genus, more precisely
constituting some of the very ten genera from scratch. For not all entities
that are from an operation of the intellect are things of second intention,
but only those that are from an act of the intellect in such a way that they
are the forms from the part of reason under which things become rational,
and which are not considered to be something of a natural entity, reason
why they are more conveniently said to be things of second intention and
things of reason.61
(20) But these entities of which we speak are from an act of the intellect
in such a way that the intellect determines them in relation to the nat-
ural things as certain forms and as manners of the natural entities, and
this according to the different determinate natures of the different genera.
Hence, it is also necessary that the natural entities fall in the definitive62
notion of these as that which is the most formal in the definition, inas-
much as they are entities in that they take the notion of their entity from
these that are natural entities. And because according to this manner
they are something of the entities naturally real, which are things of first
intention,63 that is why they are also things of first intention classed in a
genus according to their own notions, of all which entities the constituting
principle is, nevertheless, the intellect. However, the end is not for them
some nature, according to what nature is distinguished from those that are
in the intellect, but their end can be said some perfection that is acquired
59The remaining seven of the Aristotelian accidents–relation, place, time, position, state, action,
and passion–are not caused by a natural act. Note that they are caused by OUTIN-causes, because
they were removed from the OUT-causes and they cannot be IN-causes, either.
60Et voilà! Dietrich is finally getting to the point. Recall that for Dietrich principles are what I
call IN-causes; so, he is saying that the ur-IN-causes of an entity–and these alone–are either natural
or mental.
61This is the paragraph in which Dietrich “throws the first bomb”: If the remaining seven accidents
are not in a substance due to a natural act (i.e. due either to IN-causes or OUT-causes), then
necessarily they must be caused by the intellect, as there are only two kinds of ur-principles, nature
or the intellect. But these accidents are not mere things of second intention, or things of reason
(entia rationis), by means of which things become rational and as they were typically spoken of; for
Dietrich, these accidents truly are things of first intention. Where is Dietrich bound to?
62That defines.
63Is Dietrich putting the things of first intention on the same footing with the natural things, i.e.
is he saying that they have the same ontological status?
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by an action of the intellect.64
(21) That such entities are caused by an act of the intellect, as well as in
which way and for what reason they are classed in a categorial genus, and
also their difference with regard to the things of second intention, all these
issues shall be examined below from the beginning of the second part and
in turn.
(22) It is thus evident what the notion and manner of being is according
to the consideration of its causes, and what sort of entities according to
this do or do not exist in it according to what underlies its causes.65
(23) But with respect to the third aforementioned way of creating things
dependent on some thing by essence, it must be observed that such a
way cannot befit substances. In fact, substances have by themselves and
absolutely the character of a complete entity, both with respect to the
perfection of their formal act and with respect to the perfection of the
end, and not from the fact that they are formally something of some thing
or from some thing in terms of the form, in which consists the whole notion
of this third way.
(24) Hence, this way is only to be found in those entities that are in
substances. To originate a thing in such a way that the very principle
is outside the essence or outside the substance of that whose principle it
is, neither in the way of an efficient cause or of an end, but by means of
which the thing formally has its essence, nor, however, from an act or form
exemplifying it, but rather, so to speak, quiddifying it, this, I say, cannot
befit but those entities whose essence consists in being something of some
thing, namely in being a manner or a determination of some substance
that really is an entity, or in being a property either of a substance or of
some other thing of a different nature.66
(25) And because all such entities either truly are accidents or have the
manner of an accident,67 that is why regarding all of them we verify what
the Philosopher says in the beginning of Book VII of the Metaphysics,
to wit, that accidents are “entities, because they belong to an entity”:68
In fact, their whole entity is none other than that they are something of
an entity that is a substance. And this is the notion of the analogy that
is considered between a substance and the actual accidents inasmuch as
they sustain the categorization of an entity, as is said in Book IV of the
Metaphysics.69 Which analogy is not in terms of something that happens
to a substance or to an accident, but each one of them is said an entity
thanks to its essence. Indeed, the intention of being is the first and most
formal of all intentions, and according to it a thing is first known as being
64Dietrich does after all distinguish the natural things and the things of first intention, though the
distinction is a very subtle one.
65So, Dietrich is quite finished with the top level of this causality-based upper ontology, to use
contemporary jargon (see Part 2 of this article).
66Dietrich sums up his distinction substance vs. accident.
67Dietrich appears to say that properties have the manner of an accident.
68Aristotle, Met. VII, 1, 1028a18.
69Aristotle, Met. IV, 2, 1003b5-6.
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formally distinct from nothingness. Which cannot be thanks to something
that would happen accidentally to a thing.70
(26) Hence, a substance is said to be an entity by its essence in terms of
absolute subsistence, but those entities that are in substances are similarly
said to be entities by essence, though in relation to a substance.
(27) Not as in relation to a cause, though this is true, that is, that sub-
stances are the causes of accidents: In fact, every accident is said to be an
entity by its essence, not involving any cause, as was said above.71
(28) Nor in relation to a substance as to a subject in terms of inherence,
if one may speak like this. In fact, the relation to a subject in terms of
inherence by nature and by the intellect is posterior to that which inheres;
hence, those entities that inhere in substances do not have their entity
from this relation.72 According to this notion of inhering, out of such a
form and a subject an entity is created accidentally, or relatively, whose
principle, in that it is such an entity, is not only the subject but in fact
the inhering form, precisely rather the very form, as it is in terms of the
act the principle of such an entity. Hence, according to Avicenna to be in
a subject is not the essence of an accident, but a natural property of its.73
(29) But each one of them is said to be an entity, because it is a certain
manner or a determination of an entity, and this is the essence of each
one of them. Hence, also the definitions saying what each one of them is
are by addition, and a thing of a different nature joins in, which does not
happen in substances, as is shown in Book VII of the Metaphysics.74
(30) Because in reality neither a substance nor those entities that exist in
substances are formally said entities in relation to their causes, as was said,
given that a substance is said an entity in terms of absolute subsistence
and an entity in itself in terms of the intrinsic formal act, and the entities
that exist in it cannot have this perfection with respect to their quiddity
and essential subsistence, that is why they only have the character of an
entity according to this third way of originating,75 which is to those entities
70Every entity differs from nothingness thanks to the intention of being, which is the first and
most formal of all intentions. Recall that there are only two intentions, first and second, and we
have already been informed that the accidents are not things of second intention. This is actually
the paragraph in which the “second bomb is thrown”: Accidents are in fact substances, too, Dietrich
suggests. Even if they are substances only by analogy, the fact is that it appears that Dietrich is
putting the causal powers of the intellect on the same footing with the causal powers of nature. (Note
that no causal divine powers are at all mentioned in this text, an interesting aspect in a medieval text
on the causes of the entities that compose reality.) And he does so from the viewpoint of knowledge.
As I state in Part 2 above, this is epistemological idealism, and a (very) strong one, for that matter.
71Cf. (9)-(10). Dietrich is saying that it is not the substances themselves that are the causal origin
of the accidents; as seen above, if these are taken in themselves, then they are substances, too.
72The relation between substance and accidents cannot be one of inherence, either, as this relation
is posterior to the existence of that which inheres, both by nature and by the intellect.
73Avicenna, Logica I, Venetiis 1508, 9va, l. 54-60. To be sure, taken as substances, then accidents,
too, have IN-causes, namely properties if the form alone is considered.
74Aristotle, Met. VII, 5, 1031a1-3. But a difference between the substance and the accidents does
exist: It is the very essence, or definition, of the latter to be superadded to substances.
75OUTIN-causes.
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that are in substances as a complement of the second way,76 which is that
more appropriate to substances.77
3.5 A Causality-Based Upper Ontology: The Top Level
In the first part of the De origine, Dietrich elaborates on the categories in general
and on the substance, the first category in the Aristotelian list, in particular. The
remaining nine categories are for Aristotle the accidents, or, in a more contemporary
jargon, attributes of the substance. Both the substance and the accidents are entities.
It is here relevant to isolate his definition of these most basic ontological concepts:78
Entity: That which is in itself and is complete in terms of the act that belongs to
it according to its own genus; that which has the nature and the character
of an entity in its essence, and not according to the sole designation. (1)
Substance: That which has by itself and absolutely the character of a complete entity,
with respect to both its formal act and the perfection of its end, and not
because it is something of some thing, or from some thing, in terms of the
form. (23)
Accident: That which is in a substance thanks to an extrinsic principle. By analogy,
it is also a substance. (25)
This is the starting point for Dietrich’s ur-partitioning of reality. As would be expected
from any medieval philosopher who was a reader of Aristotle and his commentators,
the ur-partition of the entities separates the substance from the accidents, but we
must pair it with the ur-partition mentioned above that includes the entities of the
first and of the second intention, so that we might have the following ur-partition:
Entity




















Mental Act { OUTIN-Cause { Formal subsistence
Dietrich’s terminological distinction cause / principle / element is not always consis-
tent, reason why I call his principles, or intrinsic causes, IN-causes, and his causes
proper, or extrinsic causes, OUT-causes; I call OUTIN-causes what he refers to as
extrinsic principles. It is important to emphasize, as Dietrich does in (1), that causes
76The IN-causes.
77Dietrich sums up the idea of why the OUTIN-causes are necessary when ur-partitioning reality.
78See footnotes in the translated text for clarification of concepts.
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here are not to be taken as necessary causes, but rather as causes in the sense that
they entail a direct dependency with respect to an entity, or its principle. Dietrich sees
the former as indirect dependency and he calls the latter causal origins, i.e. causes
that make it so that an entity begins to exist as such from its own essence.
In (7), Dietrich introduces a new ur-distinction of entities, appearing to say that








and again one may wonder if this is directly paired with the ur-segregation of causes.
But this possible equivalence that would pair substances, either simple or com-
posite, with a natural cause, and the accidents with a mental cause, either of the first
or of the second intention, is not concretized. Indeed, when Dietrich is finished with
the ur-segreation of both causes and entities, he starts elaborating on the “attributes”
of the latter, and he then starts to diverge from the auctoritates he so far appears
to have followed by and large. The main novelty is that he separates the accidents
in two classes, and does so according to their causes (Fig. 7): Quantity and quality
are isolated from the remaining accidents as having solely IN-causes or OUT-causes,
respectively; the latter accidents have solely OUTIN-causes.




















Figure 7: Dietrich’s causality-based ur-partition of the Aristotelian categories.
Figure 8 shows the top-level of Dietrich’s upper ontology. In this ur-segregation
of the entity into simple and composite substances and their “attributes,” the intel-
ligences pose a problem: They are said to have no accidents, and appear to have
no other “attributes” whatsoever, being said to attain the perfection of their end by
their own operation, or intrinsic end. But the end, in the sense of the Aristotelian
final cause, is an OUT-cause. Is this “end within,” as Dietrich puts it, another type
of cause? Moreover, if the intelligences have neither accidents nor any other kind of
“attributes,” how can they be known? As a matter of fact, Dietrich appears to accept
them at a purely theoretical level, referring to them as “the sort of things that the
philosophers believed to be certain entities they called intelligences” (14), and suggest-
ing the unlikelihood of their existence a few lines below this. We can consider these
intelligences, as Dietrich appears to do, as purely theoretical entities like the ether,
also called the fifth element or quintessence, which played a central role in physics
until the 1ate 19th century, namely in the theories of gravity and of the traveling
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Figure 8: Ur-segregation of substances and their attributes by causal origin.
of light, and which resists removal from the (causal) ontologies of physics (see, e.g.,
Dirac, 1951). In effect, the fact that they appear to have no attributes whatsoever,
or that they might have attributes that have so far eluded our cognitive abilities,
might be theoretically useful to explain anomalies in physical models, to name just a
possible application. I thus propose that we rename this potentially useful subclass
of natural entities as quintessences, something already done by others in the field of
natural science (e.g., Caldwell et al., 1998; Carroll, 1998; Cicoli et al., 2012; Zlatev et
al., 1999), and leave open the question of their lacking of attributes or, if this is not
an empty set, what they might be (like), namely in relation to their causal origin in
their “end within” or operation.
Another question in this ur-segregation is posed by the properties of the simple
essences, which Dietrich tells us are not accidents, but have the manner of accidents.
He does not give any instance of a property in this first part of the De origine, but
there might be an answer in the remaining parts 2-5. Also, if these simple essences
are, as I think they are, mathematical objects like the numbers and geometric shapes,
then an exhaustive listing of properties would be impossible (see, e.g., Korbmacher &
Schiemer, 2018; Materna, 2007; Sfard, 1991). Suffice it for the time being to accept
them as distinct from the accidents, which are exhaustively listed in Figure 8.
Focusing now on the ur-segregation of causes, Dietrich does not appear to consider
more than the OUTIN-causes for the mental entities, but this poses the problem of
what the causal origins of the things of second intention, as well as of things of first
intention other than the accidents, if there are any, are. But these are the only new
issues with this ur-partition, and as a matter of fact they might be (dis)solved in the
remaining parts of the treatise (Dietrich will address the second intentions on part 2,
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we are told). The proposed top-level of the causality-based upper ontology extracted
from the first part of De origine is as shown in Figure 9.
4 Conclusions and Work to Do
Dietrich’s original aim when writing the first part of the De origine, provided above
in a translation from the Latin into English, was to elaborate on the origin of the
categories in general and in particular on the substance, and in doing so he actually
provided us with the top level of a causality-based upper ontology (see Fig. 9). Like
most medieval upper ontologies–in the sense that we can today analyze medieval on-
tologies from this viewpoint–, this one is reductionist, with only a few ur-partitions,
and endurantist, very little reference made to time except as an Aristotelian cate-
gory. However, Dietrich considers time as an accident to be a mental entity, and
this might suggest some anticipation of time, and possibly also space, as pure in-
tuitions in the Kantian sense (see Kant, 1781/2007), a question undoubtedly worth
researching into. Dietrich’s, like most medieval ontologies, is also revisionary, based
on Aristotle’s highly complex metaphysics, but the exclusively revisionist character of
this upper ontology is not certain: In later medieval philosophy, there is an emergent
representationalist concept of the knowing subject that is assimilated by the Domini-
can scholastics, Dietrich of Freiberg in particular (Augusto, 2006a-b, 2009), and the
fact that this upper ontology considers the very ur-segregation of entities to be that
between natural and mental entities suggests a central role to the human mind. This
aspect is not elaborated on in the first part of the De origine, but it is so in the
remaining parts, and we can reach a definite conclusion in further work. My guess is
that this upper ontology is both revisionary and descriptive.
The fact that it is a causality-based upper ontology rooting in a ur-segregation
between natural and mental causes makes it of particular interest to today’s effort of
engineering upper ontologies for scientific domains, especially so for mathematics or
other domains strongly rooted in mathematics. The numbers, for instance, if seen as
simple essences, are real or natural entities that have only properties, whose causal
origin is to be found in their IN-causes, namely in their form. Interestingly, in this
particular point Dietrich can be said to advocate a realism of forms, or platonism.
Quantity, another core concept in mathematics (though perhaps in applied rather than
pure mathematics), however, is to be found only in natural composite entities, and
has its causal origin in the IN-causes of the natural things, which correspond to the
formal and material causes in Aristotle’s metaphysics. But relations, central objects
in contemporary mathematics, are here considered as mental entities, having as causal
origin a novel notion of Dietrich’s, the OUTIN-causes, or principles of something (thus
intrinsic to this entity’s essence) that are however extrinsic to something else, but
without which this “something else,” or entities like the relations, would not be able
to subsist formally. I have argued (Augusto, 2006a) that these OUTIN-causes are the
human mind’s principles for the cognition of reality, and they are causal with respect
to its objects in the sense that the objects are only insofar as they are known. This
is epistemological idealism (Augusto, 2005), and a very strong form thereof, a topic
that deserves more attention now in light of its import for (scientific) upper-ontology
engineering.
The causality-based ur-segregation of entities carried out by Dietrich of Freiberg
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impacts significantly on the whole of later medieval philosophy, and this also requires
attention per se. For instance, the fact that he actually partitions the Aristotelian
categories as shown in Figure 7 constitutes, in itself, an object for careful study, whose
results promise to contribute to both our knowledge of this period in the Western
philosophical tradition and today’s ontological investigations in either MO or FO.
Importantly, Figure 9 shows but the top level of Dietrich’s causality-based upper
ontology, so that this might be more extensive or profuse. In paragraph (21) of the
translation above, Dietrich tells us that in the second part of the De origine he is
going to elaborate on the mental entities, namely those classified as categories, and
also on how they differ from the things of second intention. I tackle these issues in a
forthcoming article, in which I provide the translation of the second part of the De
origine.
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